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PLEA AT YOUR PERIL: WHEN IS A VACATED PLEA STILL A 
PLEA FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES? 
AMANY RAGAB HACKING* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Anti-immigrant sentiment continues to run high in the United States.  Laws 
passed and regulations adopted by administrations have made it easier for non-
citizens to be deported.  The Department of Justice, under President Barack 
Obama, continues to enforce these laws and regulations.1 
One method that immigration courts use to maintain the steady stream of 
deportations from this country involves the removal of individuals who have 
been convicted of a crime.  Some regulations specifically provide that when 
immigrants are convicted of certain crimes, they are to be deported.2  This 
much is clear.  However, this clarity becomes murky when immigration courts 
handle convictions that have been subsequently vacated by state-court judges 
and the prosecutors who obtained the convictions.  Immigration courts, 
displaying pro-deportation leanings, have exploited this murkiness by 
completely disregarding properly vacated convictions.  Most immigration 
courts maintain the position that these convictions were vacated only to avoid 
the harsh consequences of deportation, and as such, remain “convictions” for 
purposes of immigration proceedings. 
This paper argues that immigration judges should not be in the business of 
second-guessing the motives behind local judges and prosecutors who 
decide—for whatever reason—to vacate a guilty plea.  While at least one 
circuit court has taken steps towards limiting the discretion that immigration 
 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law and Attorney.  The 
author wishes to acknowledge her research assistant, John Orbe, for his significant and invaluable 
assistance in the preparation of this article, and her husband James O. Hacking, III, an 
immigration attorney, for his inspiration and insight. 
 1. Many cases have been decided on this issue since President Obama took office.  See, 
e.g., In re Cardenas Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009), vacated, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10498 
(2d Cir. May 24, 2010); In re Almanza-Arenas, 24 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2009); In re Zorilla-
Vidal, 24 I&N Dec. 768 (BIA 2009); In re Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 2009). 
 2. See Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement 
Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1064–67 (2002).  Criminal convictions 
serving as the basis for removal can generally be classified as crimes of moral turpitude, drug 
offenses, or aggravated felonies.  Id. 
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judges have in reviewing the rationale behind a vacated conviction, other 
circuit courts have rejected such a clear approach.  Indeed, this paper argues 
the proper approach is this: if a state court decides to vacate a conviction, 
federal immigration officials should honor that decision and treat the original 
conviction as a nullity.  Immigration officials should not be able to initiate or 
continue removal proceedings based, in whole or in part, upon a conviction 
that no longer exists.  The approach advocated here follows the constitutional 
mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and, more importantly, limits the 
significant leeway that immigration courts presently afford themselves to 
continue removing people who no longer have a criminal conviction on their 
record. 
The next section of this paper, Part II, discusses the fundamental question 
of what constitutes a conviction.  This seemingly simple question has resulted 
in confusion and inconsistent results, leading Congress to adopt a federal 
statute that answers the question once and for all.  Next, Part III addresses the 
difficulty in actually vacating a plea or a conviction.  Part IV discusses 
Pickering v. Gonzales.  Parts V and VI analyze the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Pinho v. Gonzales, and cases subsequent to Pinho, and suggest that the 
approach of accepting the state trial judge and prosecutor’s decision to vacate a 
plea or a conviction at face value is the proper approach. 
II.  WHAT IS A CONVICTION? 
Prior to 1996, immigration law did not define the term “conviction”—the 
Immigration and Nationality Act assumed the term had a common definition.3  
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) routinely deferred to state 
law “in determining whether an immigrant was ‘convicted.’”4  This lack of a 
common federal definition produced confusion, as the states had varied 
definitions of what constituted a “conviction.”5  This divergent approach 
among the states created “difficulty in fashioning a uniform national 
immigration policy with respect to prior convictions.”6  Lack of a uniform 
policy created a “small uproar” in the immigration community.7  In Congress’s 
view, the problem was that: “[t]here exist[ed] in the various [s]tates a myriad 
of provisions for ameliorating the effects of a conviction.  As a result, aliens 
 
 3. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2005); Ekwutozia U. Nwabuzor, Note, 
The Cry of the Colossus: Discipio v. Ashcroft, Nonacquiescence, and Judicial Deference in 
Immigration Law, 50 HOW. L.J. 575, 581 (2007). 
 4. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 205. 
 5. Nwabuzor, supra note 3, at 581–82 (stating that “[i]n the immigration context, the 
myriad of state definitions caused confusion[,]” as “[m]any states also had various avenues for 
post-conviction relief available to non-citizens who wished to avoid removal”). 
 6. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 205. 
 7. Nwabuzor, supra note 3, at 576. 
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who ha[d] clearly been guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress 
intended to be considered ‘convicted’ ha[d] escaped the immigration 
consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”8  In an attempt to “close 
the loopholes,”9 and settle any confusion, Congress passed the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).10  
The IIRIRA sought to establish parameters for the term by defining a 
conviction as: 
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication 
has been withheld, where— 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding 
of guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 
alien’s liberty to be imposed.11 
The definition of “conviction” set out in the IIRIRA is the governing law 
for immigration purposes.12  Thus, a disposition may be considered a 
“conviction” for immigration purposes if it meets the federal definition, even if 
it would not be considered a conviction in the state or jurisdiction of the 
underlying proceeding.13  This definition proves helpful in certain cases; 
however, given alternative sentencing approaches, as well as procedures to 
“undo” convictions, all convictions are not created equal.  Take for example, 
cases with withheld or deferred adjudication, or cases seeking post-conviction 
relief, discussed below. 
A. Withheld or Deferred Adjudication 
In some instances, the sentencing court may convict the immigrant but 
withhold sentencing if the immigrant complies with terms of probation.  In 
 
 8. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996). 
 9. Nwabuzar, supra note 3, at 582–83. 
 A savvy criminal defense lawyer could successfully plea bargain her client to a 
sentence that was one day less than the INA required for removal.  Also, an otherwise 
deportable non-citizen could successfully petition for post-conviction relief and have the 
sentence ameliorated to avoid removal.  Some felt that these discrepancies in the law led 
many “eligible” criminal non-citizens escaping the reach of the INS. 
Id. at 582. 
 10. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRIRA], Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
 11. IIRIRA § 332(a)(1).  This definition modified the BIA definition for conviction in In re 
Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988). 
 12. Norton Tooby, Anatomy of a Conviction, in 39TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 171, 191–92 (Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Cynthia Juarez Lange 
eds., 2006). 
 13. Id. 
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Missouri, such an approach may result in a “suspended imposition of sentence” 
(“SIS”)14 or a “suspended execution of sentence” (“SES”).15  This type of 
withheld or deferred adjudication, where a penalty is applied,16 constitutes a 
conviction for immigration purposes “based on the fact that the defendant must 
enter a plea of guilty or no contest, and a punishment follows.”17  However, if 
no penalty is subsequently applied, the second prong of the IIRIRA definition 
is not met, and there is no conviction for immigration purposes.18 
Similarly, when an immigrant-defendant enters a pretrial intervention or 
diversion program, there is no conviction for immigration purposes.19  As 
opposed to withheld adjudication discussed above, which requires a 
probationary period after a plea, under a pretrial intervention or diversion 
program, the probationary period is completed before a plea is ever entered.20  
Thus, without a plea—no formal admission of guilt on the record—the first 
prong of the IIRIRA definition is not satisfied, and there is no conviction for 
immigration purposes.21  These, of course, are important options for an 
immigrant-defendant to consider before accepting a guilty plea. 
B. Post-Conviction Relief 
An area of special concern for immigrant-defendants is what effect post-
conviction relief, such as a vacated sentence, has on the underlying conviction 
that may be the cause for their deportation.  Dating back to the 1940s, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has held “an expunged conviction was 
not a ‘conviction’ for immigration purposes, and adhered to that position with 
only occasional exceptions. . . .”22  However, after the passage of the IIRIRA, 
the BIA now interprets the new definition of “conviction” as creating “a 
distinction between vacated convictions based on the reasons for the 
vacatur.”23  Currently, post-conviction relief based on rehabilitation or 
immigration hardship is still considered a conviction for immigration purposes, 
 
 14. See MO. REV. STAT. § 557.011.2(3) (2000). 
 15. See § 557.011.2(4). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Ozkok, 19 I&N at 546 (where the defendant’s penalty was three years of 
probation and 100 hours of community service while the adjudication of guilt was deferred). 
 17. MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE 
TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN BORN DEFENDANTS 57 (2008). 
 18. Id. “Thus, where the court orders the defendant to pay ‘court costs,’ but no other penalty 
is imposed, there is no conviction for immigration purposes.”  Id. See also id. at 85 (citing a BIA 
decision holding the mere imposition of court costs are not considered a punishment, thus no 
conviction existed for immigration purposes). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 208 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 23. Id. at 207. 
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and therefore, a justification for deportation.24  In contrast, the BIA makes the 
distinction that a conviction vacated on the merits because of procedural or 
substantive infirmities does not.25  In considering the essence of a vacated plea, 
immigration courts often ignore just how difficult it is for an immigrant to 
actually vacate a plea or conviction. 
III.  VACATING PLEAS AND CONVICTIONS—EASIER SAID THAN DONE? 
State-court prosecutors guard their convictions, and trial judges do not take 
kindly to undoing a plea or conviction that took place in their courtroom and 
on their watch.  But, as discussed below, because it is so difficult to get a guilty 
plea or conviction reversed on appeal, the immigration attorney is usually 
forced to revisit the conviction at the trial level and seek relief there. 
An immigrant facing removal may seek post-conviction relief in an effort 
to have the conviction vacated.26  The purpose behind post-conviction relief is 
“to afford a simple and efficient remedy to any prisoner who claims that his or 
her conviction was obtained by a disregard of the fundamental fairness 
essential to the very concept of justice.”27  However, actually obtaining post-
conviction relief may be easier said than done. 
In Missouri, post-conviction relief for a person convicted of a felony after 
trial is governed by Supreme Court Rule 29.15.28  Those convicted of a felony 
upon a plea of guilty must rely on Supreme Court Rule 24.035 for relief.29  An 
individual seeking post-conviction relief under either rule must file a Missouri 
Criminal Procedure Form No. 40, and therein state every claim known to 
warrant relief from the conviction.30  If an appeal is taken, the motion must be 
filed within 90 days after the mandate of the appellate court or 180 days after 
the individual is delivered to the custody of the department of corrections if no 
appeal is taken.31  These deadlines are mandatory, and “cannot be excused for 
any reason.”32  The strict enforcement of filing deadlines, along with the grim 
prospect of success, has led Rules 29.15 and 24.035 to be considered “veritable 
forfeiture factories.”33  Given the low rate of success under the post-
 
 24. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See generally Robert G. Amsel, Avoiding Deportation by Vacating State Court 
Convictions, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 351 (2006). 
 27. 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 2223 (2006). 
 28. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (2009). 
 29. MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.035 (2009). 
 30. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (2009); MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.035 (2009).  A copy of Form 40 is 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20011121194226/www.courtrules.org/fqno40mo.htm. 
 31. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (2009); MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.035 (2009). 
 32. Henry B. Robertson, The Needle in the Haystack: Towards a New State Postconviction 
Remedy, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 337 (1992). 
 33. Id. 
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conviction-relief statutes, an immigrant seeking to have a conviction vacated is 
usually forced to seek relief in the original trial court.  An immigration 
attorney will reach out to the prosecutor who obtained the original guilty plea 
and the state trial judge who accepted the original plea in order to determine if 
there is any willingness to possibly vacate the conviction.  In most instances, 
either the trial judge or the prosecutor is unwilling to work with the 
immigration attorney to fashion an alternative to the conviction on record. 
Sometimes, however, the state court and the prosecutor will work with the 
immigration attorney and, in some instances, are even willing to vacate the 
conviction.  This takes a tremendous amount of effort on the part of all 
parties—especially the immigration attorney.  Mr. James O. Hacking, III, an 
immigration attorney in St. Louis, recently represented a woman facing 
deportation who had pled guilty to three drug misdemeanors in Missouri state 
court.34  The prosecutor in that instance was willing to consider vacating the 
convictions, and the state court ultimately agreed due to the original defense 
attorney’s failure to consider or inform the client of the almost-certain 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.35  Mr. Hacking prepared, and the 
prosecutor consented to, a Joint Motion to Vacate the Convictions.  
Subsequently, Mr. Hacking filed the Order signed by the trial judge vacating 
the convictions with the immigration court.  The Order specifically stated that 
the convictions were vacated due to the constitutional infirmity attached to the 
immigrant’s prior attorney’s failure to advise her of all possible consequences 
of her plea, including immigration consequences.  Upon receipt of this Order, 
the immigration judge terminated the removal proceedings.  In this case, the 
state-court Order and the immigration judge accepted these reasons as stated.  
The problem arises when immigration judges do not accept the stated reason 
 
 34. Allison Retka, Pleas Lead to Peril: Do Criminal Defense Attorneys Have a Duty to 
Inform Clients About Possible Deportation?, MO. LAW. WKLY., at 1, Oct. 12, 2009. 
 35. The issue of whether or not a defense attorney has an obligation to consider and inform 
an immigrant defendant of the possible deportation issues attendant to a state court guilty plea 
was recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  
Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of over 40 years and Vietnam veteran, faced deportation 
proceedings after pleading guilty to a drug offense.  Padilla sought post-conviction relief claiming 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense attorney failed to advise him of the 
immigration consequences of his plea.  Eventually, the issue reached the Supreme Court which 
agreed with Padilla and held the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
included the duty to inform clients of potential immigrations consequences that may accompany a 
plea or conviction.  In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla, immigrants seeking to 
have a conviction vacated based on their trial counsel’s failure to inform them of immigration 
consequences have a substantive ground for doing so.  As such, judges should find vacated 
convictions made under this premise valid for immigration purposes; however, what judges will 
actually do remains to be seen—will they give effect to the vacatur, or hold that the conviction 
was vacated only for immigration purposes? 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] PLEA AT YOUR PERIL 465 
but rather second-guess state-court decisions in an attempt to determine the 
perceived “true reasons” behind the state court’s decision to vacate.36 
IV.  SECOND-GUESSING STATE-COURT JUDGES: PICKERING V. GONZALES 
In seeking to vacate a plea or conviction, as Mr. Hacking did above, 
immigration attorneys must have a firm understanding of Pickering v. 
Gonzales.37  This case established a stringent test for whether a vacated 
conviction will still be considered a conviction for immigration purposes. 
In 1980, Christopher Pickering pled guilty in his native Canada to the 
unlawful possession of lysergic acid diethylamide (“LSD”).38  Pickering later 
moved to the United States with his family for his job.39  In 1996, Pickering’s 
drug offense was pardoned and he applied to obtain lawful-permanent-resident 
status; however, his application was denied.40  After the denial, Pickering 
convinced a Canadian court to quash his conviction, but was again denied 
permanent-resident status and removal proceedings were initiated.41  
Ultimately, the immigration judge in the removal proceeding declined to give 
effect to the Canadian court’s action, holding the conviction remained a 
conviction for immigration purposes.42 
On appeal, the BIA noted that “when a court vacates an alien’s conviction 
for reasons solely related to rehabilitation or to avoid adverse immigration 
hardships, rather than on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the 
underlying criminal proceedings, the conviction is not eliminated for 
immigration purposes.”43  In reaching its decision, the BIA relied on 
Pickering’s notice of appeal to the Canadian court which stated “he was 
appealing his conviction because of the bar it placed on his permanent 
immigration to the United States,” as well as the absence of anything in the 
record indicating what the Canadian court relied on to quash the conviction.44  
As a result, the BIA reasoned the conviction was quashed solely for 
immigration hardships, and thus still valid for removal purposes in light of 
IIRIRA.45 
The Sixth Circuit noted that the BIA appeared to have “imparted the 
Petitioner’s motivation for seeking to have the conviction quashed onto the 
 
 36. See generally Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 37. Id. at 265. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (also stating that Pickering’s wife and children were granted permanent resident 
status in 1993). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 265–66 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 42. Id. at 266. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 267. 
 45. See id. at 266. 
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Canadian court as its rationale for quashing the conviction,” which is of limited 
relevance in reviewing the underlying purposes for the Canadian court’s 
action.46  Rather than accept the BIA determination, the Court found the 
record47 incomplete and lacking the actual basis for the Canadian court’s 
decision.48  The Court did find relevance in the fact that Pickering appealed his 
conviction pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which 
required a Canadian court to conclude Pickering’s rights under the statute that 
had been purportedly violated.49  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held the record 
did not support the BIA’s findings, rather the BIA had “relied on certain parts 
of the Petitioner’s affidavit and notice of appeal, while minimizing or ignoring 
other parts.”50  The Court reversed the BIA decision stating “the evidence 
supporting deportation can hardly be described as ‘clear and convincing.’”51 
Although the Sixth Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision, the Court also held 
that the BIA “correctly interpreted the law” with regards to a conviction 
vacated for immigration reasons remaining a conviction for immigration 
purposes.52  It is this language from Pickering that has allowed subsequent 
immigration courts to ignore state-court decisions to vacate a conviction when 
the immigration courts believe that immigration consequences motivated the 
vacatur. 
For example, in In re Langley,53 the BIA concluded that the immigrant 
remained “convicted” of a felony for immigration purposes despite the fact that 
a Montana state court vacated the felony conviction and entered a 
misdemeanor conviction instead.54  Rather than accepting the Montana court’s 
decision to vacate the felony conviction, the BIA looked to the state court’s 
order and conviction documents, which the BIA felt did not “identify the legal 
basis for the decision to grant the [Respondent’s Motion to Vacate].”55  
However, the BIA noted that during proceedings, the state court judge 
indicated “the modified resolution of this case is in response to the possibility 
that [the immigrant] . . . could be deported . . . .”56  In light of this remark, the 
 
 46. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 47. The record did not include a record of the Canadian hearing or reveal any basis for that 
court’s action.  Id. at 267, 269 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 48. Id. at 267. 
 49. Id. at 268. 
 50. Id. at 269. 
 51. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 269–71 (6th Cir. 2004). Id. at 269–71. 
 52. Id. at 266, 267. 
 53. In re Langley, File: A73 385 650 - Seattle, 2004 WL 1739155 (BIA June 29, 2004), 
aff’d, . 182 F. App’x 641, 642 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 54. Id. (also stating that the felony conviction rendered respondent removable, while the 
misdemeanor conviction would not). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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BIA determined the felony was vacated for immigration purposes, and thus 
remained a felony conviction rendering the respondent removable.57 
Similarly, in Sanusi v. Gonzales,58 the Sixth Circuit concluded that an 
Arkansas state court vacated the defendant’s conviction solely to avoid 
immigration consequences, leaving the man “convicted” for immigration 
purposes.59  Sanusi, a native of Indonesia, was cited in Arkansas for property 
theft.60  The misdemeanor carried a maximum possible sentence of one year, 
which made it a removable offense for immigration purposes.61  In lieu of a 
court appearance, Sanusi opted to pay a $600 fine.62  Several years later, 
removal proceedings were initiated against Sanusi, leading him to ask the 
Arkansas court to vacate the theft conviction.63  In his petition to vacate, 
Sanusi acknowledged that the only way to avoid deportation was to have his 
conviction vacated.64  Additionally, he asserted that the procedure the 
Arkansas court established to expeditiously resolve the matter did not 
contemplate the severe consequences for aliens who would face deportation by 
simply paying the fine.65  The Arkansas court granted Sanusi’s petition to 
vacate his conviction without providing any explanation for doing so.66  
Nevertheless, an immigration judge, the BIA, and the Sixth Circuit all 
successively concluded the Arkansas court granted the vacatur petition for 
immigration purposes.67  The Sixth Circuit concluded that because Sanusi’s 
petition cited his pending immigration consequences without providing a 
colorable legal ground for a vacatur, his “conviction was vacated for the sole 
purpose of relieving Sanusi from deportation.”68  Because the Court concluded 
his conviction was vacated to avoid immigration hardships, Sanusi remained 
“convicted” for immigration purposes.69 
The manner in which immigration courts and the BIA now interpret 
Pickering allows these courts tremendous freedom—undoubtedly too much 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Sanusi v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 59. See generally id. For other cases refusing to accept a state court vacatur, and instead 
finding the defendant still “convicted” for immigration purposes, see Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 
17 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 60. Sanusi, 474 F.3d at 343. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. Of the total amount, $500 was for a “criminal fine” and $100 was for “criminal 
costs.” Id. Paying the fine amounted to a guilty plea as to the property theft charge, thus leaving 
Sanusi convicted of the charge. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Sanusi v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341, 343–44 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 66. Id. at 344. 
 67. Id. at 344–45, 347–48. 
 68. Id. at 347. 
 69. Id. at 347–48. 
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freedom—to second-guess the motives of state-court prosecutors and judges 
who decide, for whatever reason, to vacate a conviction.  Due-process 
concerns are implicated as there is no certainty of outcome for immigrants 
facing deportation and there is no hard-and-fast standard to be used.  There is 
too much reliance upon the immigration courts “guessing” why the particular 
conviction was vacated.  A need exists for a more objective standard.  
Moreover, an immigrant-defendant is not given the opportunity to present 
evidence as to the actual motives of the state-court judge and/or prosecutor in 
deciding to vacate the conviction. 
In addition, this “super” review by federal immigration courts runs afoul of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.70  Federal 
administrative agencies and courts are required by the Constitution to give full 
faith and credit to decisions by state courts.  Allowing immigration courts to 
try and glean the “real motives” behind decisions to vacate a plea or conviction 
strips the state courts of the very authority to vacate the plea or conviction. 
Viewed in a benign light, the problem is simply one of allowing 
immigration courts too much leeway in their treatment of vacated pleas or 
convictions.  However, viewed slightly differently, the post-Pickering 
approach gives the immigration courts free rein to declare by fiat that a 
particular vacated plea or conviction does not pass muster and to then void 
state-court decisions. 
It has been the unfortunate experience of numerous immigration attorneys 
to have presented clear and unequivocal vacated convictions to the 
immigration court, only to have them discounted or completely disregarded.  
These courts frequently place the burden—either explicitly or implicitly—
upon the immigrant and the attorney to prove that the court’s decision to vacate 
a conviction was not done for immigration purposes.  This approach runs 
contrary to the requirement that the government show removability by clear 
and convincing evidence.71 
These fundamental defects with Pickering need to be remedied through a 
bright-line rule.  The Third Circuit moved toward a clearer, more sensible 
approach in the case of Pinho v. Gonzales. 72 
V.  PINHO V. GONZALES 
In Pinho, the Third Circuit established a categorical test to guide the 
determination of when a vacated criminal conviction remains a “conviction” 
 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 71. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“In the proceeding the Service has the burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted 
to the United States, the alien is deportable.”). 
 72. Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 215 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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for removal purposes.73  The Court expressed its disapproval of the BIA’s 
procedures that “require [sic] speculation about, or scrutiny of, the reasons for 
judges’ actions other than those reasons that appear on the record.”74  Judge D. 
Michael Fisher recognized the pitfalls of the BIA’s dubious approach to 
examining the underlying reasons for a vacatur stating: 
Were we to allow the Department of Homeland Security to base its legal 
determinations of immigrants’ statutory eligibility for adjustment status upon 
hypothetical scenarios . . . we would be opening the door to—indeed in many 
cases due process would require—a flood of subpoenas to judges and 
prosecutors of sovereign states ordering them to appear in federal immigration 
proceedings to answer questions about motives, feelings, and sympathies that 
appear nowhere in the record, but may have prompted their official action . . . 
[W]e see the specter of such unseemly inquisitions.75 
Aside from the absurdity of such a process,76 Judge Fisher acknowledged 
that considerations of comity and federalism require deference to the state-
court decisions.77  Perhaps most significant in the Pinho decision is Judge 
Fisher’s recognition of the need for a bright-line rule regarding the status of 
vacated convictions: if immigrants are to have any certainty as to the effect that 
state court criminal proceedings may have on their immigration status, those 
bounds must be drawn plainly and brightly.78  Accordingly, Judge Fisher 
proceeded to announce a simple test that proves useful for future courts that 
may encounter similar issues: 
To determine the basis for a vacatur order, the agency must look first to the 
order itself. If the order explains the court’s reasons for vacating the 
conviction, the agency’s inquiry must end there. If the order does not give a 
clear statement of reasons, the agency may look to the record before the court 
when the order was issued. No other evidence of reasons may be considered.79 
VI.  POST-PINHO 
Some courts have been receptive to the Pinho rationale for a categorical 
test to determine whether an alien is convicted for immigration purposes under 
Pickering.  For instance, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the Pinho test in Cruz v. 
Attorney General.80  In Cruz, the BIA denied the appeal of a removal order for 
 
 73. Id. See also Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction and the Lost Cause 
of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 689–90 (2008). 
 74. Id. at 212. 
 75. Id. at 211–12. 
 76. Id. at 212 (“Whether or not constitutional avoidance requires this result, avoidance of 
absurdities surely does.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 215. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Cruz v. Attorney Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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an immigrant whose conviction was subsequently vacated.81  The BIA reached 
its decision based on the timeliness of Cruz’s appeal, without deciding whether 
he remained convicted under Pickering.82  The Third Circuit ultimately 
remanded to the BIA to consider whether Cruz remained convicted for 
immigration purposes.83  In so doing, the Court suggested the Pinho test must 
be applied to all similar cases by stating: “Even if we assume that the BIA 
rejected the argument that Cruz’s conviction had been vacated for immigration 
purposes, we could not affirm that determination without assuring ourselves 
that the Board had reached this conclusion in accordance with the categorical 
test we established in Pinho.”84 
In re Escobar-Guerra85 took Pinho a step further by applying the 
categorical test to the facts.86  In this case, the BIA faced a decision on whether 
a vacated conviction was substantive or rehabilitative.87  In making the 
determination, the BIA noted the state court was silent as to its rationale for 
vacating the underlying conviction.88  Thus, under the second prong of the 
Pinho test, the BIA’s analysis shifted to the record produced when the vacating 
order was issued.89  The BIA reasoned that because the respondent’s 
unopposed motion to vacate the conviction cited ineffective representation for 
support, the state court’s vacatur was based on substantive grounds.90 
However, not all courts have received the Pinho decision in the same 
manner.  For instance, the court in Rumierz v. Gonzales91 distinguished Pinho 
and in so doing, reached a result the Pinho test hoped to avoid.92  Rumierz, 
faced with deportation proceedings, petitioned a Vermont state court for relief 
from his underlying criminal conviction.93  The Vermont court granted 
Rumierz’s petition;94 however, the order vacating the underlying conviction 
was silent as to the grounds.95  Additionally, an affidavit filed later stated “the 
merits of [Rumierz’s] claim were not addressed or adjudicated” in connection 
 
 81. See id. at 243. 
 82. Id. at 248. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. In re Escobar-Guerra, File: A96 263 387 - York, 2006 WL 3485830 (BIA Oct. 12, 
2006). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 92. Id. at 49. 
 93. See id. at 34. 
 94. Id. (stating that the Vermont court struck Rumierz’s conviction for possession of stolen 
property and amended it to negligent operation of a motor vehicle). 
 95. Id. 
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with the order vacating the conviction.96  Instead of looking to the record as the 
Pinho test directs, the BIA placed the burden on the petitioner to show his 
vacatur was based on substantive grounds.97  The First Circuit upheld this 
procedure, which goes against the Pinho test.98  Under the Pinho test, 
Rumierz’s conviction would remain vacated because the record did not show 
the Vermont court was motivated by immigration considerations.  For the same 
reason, Rumierz could not satisfy the burden the court placed on him of 
showing that the vacatur was not motivated by immigration hardships.99  Thus, 
despite his vacated conviction, the court held Rumierz remained “convicted,” 
and therefore, removable.100 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Immigrants in this country are facing higher and higher hurdles in their 
fight to resist removal.  This is particularly true for immigrant-defendants who, 
although successful in vacating a plea or conviction, can still be removed on 
the basis of that vacated plea or conviction because immigration judges are 
able to second-guess the motives behind the local judges and prosecutors who 
made that decision.  While the Third Circuit in Pinho established a test to 
guide the determination of when a vacated criminal conviction remains a 
“conviction” for removal purposes,101 subsequent courts have not necessarily 
followed it, leading to uncertainty and confusion. 
As Judge Fisher recognized in Pinho, permitting immigration judges to 
base their deportation decisions on “hypothetical scenarios,” not supported by 
the legal record or perhaps making the immigrant-defendants create a record 
whereby local judges and prosecutors would be hauled into immigration court 
to testify regarding their reasons for vacating a plea or conviction, is hardly 
sensible.102  All of this, of course, as Judge Fisher acknowledged, also ignores 
considerations of comity and federalism requiring deference to the state-court 
decisions.103  Finally, and as this paper argues, most significantly, is Judge 
Fisher’s recognition in the Pinho decision of the need for a bright-line rule 
regarding the status of vacated convictions.104 
Perhaps the Pinho decision did not go far enough in establishing a bright-
line rule that would create certainty and consistency in an immigration court’s 
 
 96. Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. at 35–39. The dissent sharply criticized the majority’s decision for failure to apply the 
Pinho test. Id. at 44–54. 
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 102. See id. at 211–12. 
 103. Id. at 212. 
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handling of an immigrant’s vacated plea or conviction.  Pinho suggests that an 
immigration court should first look to the state-court order to determine the 
basis for the vacatur, and if the order states the reason or reasons for vacating 
the conviction, then that is accepted without further review.105  If, however, the 
order fails to provide “a clear statement of reasons, the agency may look to the 
record before the court when the order was issued.  No other evidence of 
reasons may be considered.”106  This approach permits (perhaps, requires) the 
immigration court to review the reason or reasons for a state court’s decision to 
vacate a plea or conviction.  It is this type of review and discretion by the 
immigration courts that has created uncertainty and confusion for immigrants 
facing deportation. 
This paper respectfully suggests that the rule in Pinho can be even more 
simplified—for immigrants as well as immigration courts who should not be 
burdened with the responsibility to determine the state court’s and prosecutor’s 
underlying motives for vacating a plea or conviction.  This bright-line rule 
would simply state that if an immigrant’s plea or conviction has been 
vacated—regardless of the reason, stated or otherwise—it cannot then be used 
as a basis for removal.  Simply put, immigration officials should not be able to 
initiate or continue removal proceedings based, in whole or in part, upon a 
conviction that no longer exists.  The approach advocated here follows the 
constitutional mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and, more 
importantly, limits the significant discretion that immigration courts presently 
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